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Abstract
The role of linguistic enclaves in wage determination is investigated for immigrants and
non-immigrants. It is hypothesized that enclaves could affect wages positively as an aid to
immigrant adjustment, or negatively as an amenity that minority language speakers are
willing to pay for, or both. The results suggest that enclaves in the Southwest U.S. primarily
operate as an aid to immigrant adjustment.
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Linguistic enclaves – geographic areas where a high proportion of the population speaks a
minority language – have long been recognized as an important factor in determining labor
market outcomes for immigrants. Enclaves may oﬀer cultural goods, network beneﬁts, and
lower communication costs for minority language speakers that can impact employment and
wage rates. These impacts may be interpreted as a human capital mechanism (e.g. Chiswick
and Miller 1995) or compensating diﬀerentials for amenities (Gonzalez 1998; Chiswick and
Miller 2005). In short, enclaves could positively or negatively aﬀect labor market outcomes.
But it is not clear whether these eﬀects exist for both immigrants and non-immigrants; the
focus has historically been placed on immigrant minority language speakers.
The Southwest United States, with its large Hispanic and Spanish-speaking population,
provides a unique opportunity to address this gap in the literature. Many Hispanics in the
region are Mexican, Central American, and South American immigrants or of immigrant de-
scent. But others are descended from Spanish colonialists that settled the region more than
500 years ago. Some of these communities, where Spanish is the predominant language spo-
ken in the home, are still largely intact in rural Arizona and New Mexico. This heterogeneity
provides additional variation in the comparison of immigrants and non-immigrants.
By examining immigrant and non-immigrant wage diﬀerentials, this paper investigates
the degree to which enclaves operate primarily as an aid to immigrant labor market adjust-
ment as opposed to an amenity that creates a compensating wage diﬀerential. A side-by-side
estimation of immigrant and non-immigrant wage determination is used to compare the eﬀect
of minority concentration directly on wages and on any English-deﬁciency wage penalty.
2 Background
The theory of how enclaves aﬀect wages was formalized in the context of the Spanish-speaking
Hispanic population by McManus (1990). His model has two implications. First, deﬁciencies
in English language skills should reduce wages. The intuition here is straightforward since
most economic activity in the U.S. is conducted in English. Second, this English-deﬁciency
penalty should decrease as the relative size of the Spanish-speaking enclave increases. That
is, as more people in an area speak and conduct economic activity in the minority language,
the less important are deﬁciencies in the majority language.
Independent of the human capital explanation of enclave eﬀects in McManus (1990),
enclaves may have amenity characteristics that people value. More recent empirical studies
have hypothesized that areas with a high minority concentration provide non-tradable goods,
such as ease of communication in the native tongue or access to minority cultural traditions
(Gonzalez 1998; D´ avila and Mora 2000; Chiswick and Miller 2002; Chiswick and Miller 2005).
1Following the intuition of Roback (1982), workers will bid down wages in an enclave until
an equilibrium point where utility in the enclave at lower wages is equal to utility outside
the enclave at higher wages. The amenity value of the enclave compensates residents for the
lower wage.
Most empirical work has focused on immigrant labor market outcomes and immigrant
enclaves, likely due to the salience of such areas throughout U.S. history. Immigrants living
in enclaves have been shown to acquire fewer English language skills in enclaves, and wages
are lower for those not ﬂuent in the dominant language (Chiswick and Miller 1995). Fur-
ther, the English-deﬁcient wage penalty has been shown to be signiﬁcantly smaller for those
living in an area with a higher minority concentration (Chiswick and Miller 2002). A direct
negative eﬀect of enclave residence on wages, supportive of the compensating diﬀerential
hypothesis, has also been demonstrated for immigrants (Gonzalez 1998; Chiswick and Miller
2005). Taken together, these results provide evidence consistent with McManus’ hypotheses,
and support the notion of a compensating diﬀerential for non-marketed enclave goods. In
contrast, D´ avila and Mora (2000) found no diﬀerence in the English deﬁciency penalty for
immigrants between metropolitan areas along the U.S.-Mexico border, which presumably
have higher immigrant concentrations, and other large cities. The authors also demonstrate
that wages are lower in border cities as compared to the other large cities.
Non-immigrant enclave eﬀects are less commonly studied. In McManus’ (1990) empirical
analysis, a population of Hispanic men, regardless of immigrant status, was used to conﬁrm
his two main hypotheses discussed above. English deﬁciency results in a wage penalty that
is smaller in areas with a higher concentration of Hispanics. D´ avila and Mora (2000) looked
at U.S.-born Mexican-Americans separately from immigrants and found a slightly larger
English deﬁciency penalty in borderland cities than other cities. They citied this as evidence
of a “mobility trap” created by a compensating diﬀerential. The larger deﬁciency penalty
in border cities contrasts McManus’ hypotheses and ﬁndings; it is not clear in D´ avila and
Mora why English deﬁciency should be rewarded with higher wages in areas with smaller
Spanish-speaking populations.
Comparisons of immigrant and non-immigrant wage diﬀerentials allow for tests of two
possible enclave eﬀects on wages. The ﬁrst hypothesis is that enclaves, through their in-
creased incidence of minority language usage, operate primarily as an aid in immigrant ad-
justment. Under this hypothesis enclave residence should reduce the English-deﬁcient wage
penalty for immigrants but not non-immigrants. That is, immigrants’ ability to access job
and social networks would improve their labor market performance in enclaves as compared
to non-enclaves, but non-immigrants would face relatively similar opportunities in enclaves
versus non-enclaves.
The second hypothesis is that minority language speakers value the non-marketed goods
and services available in linguistic enclaves; wages are lower, ceteris paribus, to compensate
2for these amenities. This hypothesis implies that wages are lower in enclaves for all minority
language speakers, but it is also possible that the size of this eﬀect varies by immigrant
status. A strong immigrant adjustment mechanism may imply that the amenity eﬀect of
enclaves is smaller for immigrants than for non-immigrants. On the other hand, it is possible
that non-immigrants value enclave amenities less than immigrants. Contemporary models
of assimilation suggest that native-born workers are less connected with the minority culture
than are immigrants (Alba and Nee 1997; Alba et al. 2002; South et al. 2005), which implies
a smaller willingness-to-pay for enclave amenities for non-immigrants than immigrants.
Finally, there is no reason to believe that the two hypotheses are mutually exclusive;
enclaves may oﬀer valuable non-marketed goods and services while simultaneously shelter-
ing English-deﬁcient immigrants from a harsh wage penalty outside of the enclave. This
is consistent with the ﬁndings mentioned above in Chiswick and Miller (1995; 2005) and
Gonzalez (1998), but whether both eﬀects exist remains an empirical question. The advan-
tage of comparing immigrants and non-immigrants is that each hypothesis can be evaluated
independently and simultaneously.
3 Empirical framework and data
The hypothesized eﬀects of enclaves on wages are investigated within the context of a Mincer-
type human capital wage equation. The natural log of wages is a function of years of
education, years of labor market experience, and experience squared. This empirical model
is extended by adding independent variables that control for diﬀerences in English language
proﬁciency, concentration of the minority enclave, and the interaction between language
proﬁciency and enclave concentration. The fully-speciﬁed model is,
lnWi = α + β1EDUCi + β2EXPi + β3EXP
2
i + β4LANGi + β5CONCi
+β6(LANGi × CONCi) + γ
0Xi + υi, (1)
where Wi is person i’s hourly wage, EDUCi is years of schooling, EXPi is years of potential
labor market experience, LANGi is a binary indicator of language proﬁciency, CONCi is
a measure of the minority enclave concentration, Xi is a vector of other geographic and
individual characteristics, and υi is the assumed randomly distributed error.
The hypotheses from the previous section can now be formalized using the coeﬃcients
from equation (1) for immigrants (I) and non-immigrants (N):
β6I < 0,β6N = 0 (2)
β5I < 0,β5N < 0 (3)
β5I 6= β5N (4)
3The ﬁrst hypothesis implies that the immigrant English-deﬁcient wage penalty is smaller
in higher minority concentration enclaves, but that the non-immigrant wage penalty is invari-
ant to concentration. Under the second hypothesis, higher minority concentration enclaves
reduce wages for both immigrants and non-immigrants (independent of any language pro-
ﬁciency eﬀect on wages) through a compensating diﬀerential for non-marketed goods and
services. The last equation tests against the null hypothesis that this diﬀerential is the same
for both immigrants and non-immigrants.
Equation (1) is estimated using data from the 2000 Public Use Microdata Series (PUMS)
for Arizona and New Mexico, 5% sample (Ruggles et al. 2004).1 PUMS data gives individual
responses to the long form of the decennial census and contains a wide variety of personal
and household characteristics. The sample was restricted to wage-earning men and women
between the ages of 18 and 64 who indicated that Spanish is spoken in their home. Respon-
dents who did not earn wage income, worked fewer than four weeks in 1999, and usually
worked fewer than ten hours per week were eliminated from the sample. This sample was
created to capture only those workers who are closely tied to the wage-earning labor market.
Observations with imputed data were dropped.
The dependent variable in equation (1), natural log of hourly wages, is constructed from
reported income and work behavior. That is,
Wi = wageinci/(uhrsi × wkswrki) (5)
where wageinci is reported yearly wage income, uhrsi is usual hours worked per week, and
wkswrki is number of weeks worked in 1999.
Brief descriptions of all of the variables appears in table I. The independent variables of
interest are language proﬁciency, minority concentration, and their interaction. Language
proﬁciency is measured by creating a binary variable based on self-reported English proﬁ-
ciency. LANGi is equal to one if the respondent reported the ability to speak English “well”
or “very well” and equals zero if the respondent speaks English “not well” or not at all.
Enclave concentration is measured by the density of the adult-age population that speaks
Spanish at home.2 The PUMS data, in order to maintain respondent conﬁdentiality, identiﬁes
respondents within geographic areas (called Public Use Microdata Areas, or PUMAs) with
a population of at least 100,000. CONCi is calculated from the full PUMS sample for
each PUMA and attached to each individual that resides in a given PUMA. Person weights
provided in the PUMS data are used to calculate the density of Spanish speakers in each
area.
1Data was accessed from the IPUMS website: www.ipums.org, last accessed 6/1/2006
2An alternative enclave deﬁnition is density of Hispanic population. Using this measure instead of the
linguistic enclave measure does not change the empirical results in any important way. Complete results are
available upon request.
4Other geographic and individual characteristics used as controls are urban residence, race,
marital status, and self-reported transit time to work.3 The human capital variables, edu-
cation and potential experience, have standard deﬁnitions from the literature (see Chiswick
and Miller 2005, for example).
The full sample consists of 18,663 observations, of which 7,240 are immigrants and 11,423
are native-born. Approximately 63% of the population lives in Arizona and 35% lives in the
greater Phoenix metropolitan area; overall about 56% of the population live in the three
urban centers. Summary statistics for immigrants and non-immigrants are presented in
table II.
4 Empirical results
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether enclaves impact immigrant adjustment
in labor markets, are valued for their amenity characteristics, or both. The ﬁrst step in
answering these questions is to determine if the wage equations are diﬀerent for immigrants
and non-immigrants. That is, can the statistical model be estimated on pooled immigrant
and non-immigrant data, or must separate models be estimated for each group? This is
accomplished by testing the joint null hypothesis that none of the parameters in (1) are
aﬀected by immigrant status. The null hypothesis is rejected in all model speciﬁcations,
meaning that the wage determination parameters are diﬀerent for immigrants and non-
immigrants.4 All of the results presented below are estimated separately for immigrants and
non-immigrants.
The empirical results for immigrants and non-immigrants are presented in tables III and
IV, respectively. Equation (1) is estimated separately for men and women, with the results
presented in separate panels of the tables. An unexpected result arises with respect to
the ﬁrst McManus hypothesis, that English deﬁciency should decrease wages. Native-born
Spanish speakers, whether men or women, do not appear to suﬀer a wage penalty for English
language deﬁciency; the coeﬃcient on the LANG variable is never statistically signiﬁcant for
non-immigrants and is sometimes negative. The LANG coeﬃcient for immigrants, however,
is always statistically signiﬁcant and of the expected sign.5
3Urban residence is deﬁned as living in one of the three urban counties in the Southwest, Bernalillo
County (Albuquerque, NM), Maricopa County (Phoenix, AZ), and Pima County (Tucson, AZ).
4See Griﬃths et al. (1993, 419) for the formulation of the relevant F-test statistic. Estimation and test
results are available upon request.
5Note that a positive coeﬃcient for LANG implies an English-deﬁciency penalty, since LANG equals one
if the individual is ﬂuent in English. The alternative interpretation is that there exists an English-proﬁciency
premium. For the sake of consistency, this paper will present the results in terms of the deﬁciency penalty
rather than the proﬁciency premium.
5The hypothesis that the English deﬁciency penalty decreases as minority concentration
increases cannot be rejected for immigrants but is rejected for non-immigrants. The coeﬃ-
cient on the interaction between English proﬁciency and minority concentration is negative
and signiﬁcant for immigrants but not for non-immigrants. Immigrants in enclaves appear
to be insulated from some of the negative wage eﬀects of English deﬁciency, whereas non-
immigrants face relatively similar wages regardless of enclave concentration.
There is little evidence that enclaves have any value as an amenity, at least in a way that is
observable in the Southwest labor market. In the fully speciﬁed model, neither immigrants
or non-immigrants show a statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the CONC variable. The
coeﬃcient is negative and signiﬁcant when only CONC is included, but this signiﬁcance
disappears when the LANGxCONC interaction is included in the model.
5 Discussion and conclusion
Overall the results tend to support the hypothesis that the labor market eﬀects of enclaves
operate as an aid to immigrant adjustment. The only statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of minor-
ity concentration is the reduced English deﬁciency penalty for immigrants. Non-immigrants
do not seem to bid down wages for access to enclave amenities and do not appear to beneﬁt
from the increased access to job or social networks that enclaves may provide to immigrants.
These results reject the idea of a native-born “mobility trap” suggested by D´ avila and
Mora (2000, 150), where native-born Spanish speakers are “willing to accept lower wages
to reside near fellow ethnics and Mexico” and immigrants have a low attachment to any
given region. A possible reason for this discrepancy is that it is not clear that D´ avila and
Mora’s observed reduced non-immigrant returns to English in borderland cities are due to
enclave eﬀects. No attempt was made to deﬁne borderland cities as enclaves aside from the
fact that these cities (e.g. El Paso and San Diego) are traditional immigrant destinations.
Enclaves may exist as small pockets of Mexican-American concentration within cities, and
aggregating geographically to compare Metropolitan Statistical Areas may mask or alter any
true enclave eﬀect on wages.
The results here also contradict, to some degree, Gonzalez’s (1998) observed “price of
culture” for Mexican immigrants. Instead of an amenity eﬀect, wage diﬀerentials may ac-
tually reﬂect reductions in the language deﬁciency penalty. The enclave eﬀect cannot be
unambiguously identiﬁed since the wage regressions in Gonzalez (1998) do not contain any
interactions between language proﬁciency and Mexican immigrant density.
The question now becomes why non-immigrants do not show the same interaction eﬀect
between minority concentration and the English premium. The answer to this question likely
relates to the fact that there is no observed English premium for non-immigrants. Approx-
imately 96% of non-immigrants in the sample are considered proﬁcient English speakers;
6there may not be enough variation in English proﬁciency among the native-born to identify
any English premium that may exist (at least in the available PUMS data). If there is no
English premium, then there is no premium for enclave size to have any eﬀect on.
Non-immigrants’ English skills may allow them to operate in any type of labor market,
whether dominated by English or Spanish speakers. The majority of non-immigrants in
the sample have the dual advantages of English proﬁciency and having been raised in the
dominant (i.e. English-speaking) labor markets. This would allow non-immigrants to know
of both English- and Spanish-language job networks and have the ability to access either type
of network. Thus, the relative labor market opportunities as enclave size varies would be the
same since non-immigrants could rely on either language to operate in the labor market; no
advantage would exist for residing in a larger Spanish language enclave.
This idea appears to be consistent with the theoretical framework presented in McManus
(1990). An English deﬁciency penalty will exist only “if Spanish speakers have lower per
capita capital endowments than English speakers...” (McManus 1990, 232). But if the sup-
ply of English- and Spanish-speaking non-immigrants is mostly identical in the distribution
of skills, as it appears to be in this sample for the Southwest, then the capital endowments
will be identical. With respect to McManus’ enclave eﬀects on the deﬁciency penalty, an in-
crease in the relative size of the Spanish-speaking sector where English and Spanish speakers
are perfect substitutes implies that the English and Spanish wages are identical.
A topic for future research would be to investigate the role that non-immigrant hetero-
geneity plays in determining the results. The PUMS data allows respondents to be identiﬁed
by a binary immigrant status variable, but no further information about a non-immigrant’s
history is known. Some native-born Hispanics in the Southwest are descended from Spanish
colonialists, while others are second or third generation immigrants. It may be that the true
heterogeneity of enclave eﬀects is not between immigrants and non-immigrants, but between
immigrant-descended Hispanics and Spanish-descended Hispanics. Empirical investigation
of this idea could ideally occur with more detailed microdata about family immigration
history. At a minimum, some information about the relative densities of immigrant- and
Spanish-descended Hispanics by geography would be required; to this author’s knowledge,
no such data is currently available for large samples suitable for economics research.
To conclude, the estimates of immigrant and non-immigrant wages in the Southwest
support the hypothesis that linguistic enclaves aid in immigrant labor market adjustment,
but do not exhibit any amenity value that is capitalized in wages. Previous research has
focused mainly on immigrant wage outcomes; the results here are based on comparisons
of immigrant and non-immigrant wages. While this research conﬁrms the importance of
enclave economies for immigrants in the Southwest, it calls into question the existence of a
compensating diﬀerential for enclave amenities in Southwest labor markets.
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8Table I: Descriptions of Variables
Variable Description Measured units
LnW Nat. log of hourly wage (dep. var.)
EDUC Yrs. of education Years




MARRIED Marital status (=1 if married) binary
URBAN Urban residence (=1 if resides in urban
county)
binary
BLACK Race category (=1 if Black) binary
NATIVE Race category (=1 if Native American,
Alaska Native)
binary
ASIAN Race category (=1 if Asian, Paciﬁc Is-
lander)
binary
RACE2 Race category (=1 if indicated 2 or
more races)
binary
TRAN Transit time to work minutes
LANG Language (=1 if speaks English well or
very well)
binary
CONC Density of Spanish speakers percent
LANGxCONC Interaction between LANG and CONC
9Table II: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.






























10Table III: Immigrant wage equation estimates
a. Men (obs.=4786)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
EDUC .053 (22.22) .042 (16.31) .041 (16.15) .041 (16.01)
EXP .030 (11.73) .030 (11.7) .030 (11.74) .029 (11.66)
EXPSQ -.0004 (7.61) -.0004 (7.76) -.0004 (7.82) -.0004 (7.77)
LANG .191 (11.1) .185 (10.67) .304 (8.2)
CONC -.002 (3.59) 0.0 (.12)
LANGxCONC -.004 (3.64)
MARRIED .094 (5.13) .094 (5.15) .094 (5.2) .093 (5.16)
URBAN .097 (5.56) .106 (6.19) .105 (6.1) .103 (6.02)
BLACK -.154 (1.28) -.158 (1.33) -.165 (1.39) -.164 (1.38)
NATIVE -.126 (1.31) -.124 (1.31) -.129 (1.36) -.134 (1.41)
ASIAN -.232 (.60) -.298 (.78) -.335 (.88) -.372 (.97)
RACE2 .015 (.96) .009 (.54) .010 (.60) .011 (.67)
TRAN .0005 (1.33) .0006 (1.47) .0006 (1.48) .0005 (1.39)
constant 1.15 (26.06) 1.16 (26.75) 1.23 (26.06) 1.17 (23.63)
R2 .1318 .1536 .1559 .1582
b. Women (obs.=2454)
Variable (5) (6) (7) (8)
EDUC .057 (15.35) .043 (10.43) .041 (9.8) .04 (9.68)
EXP .023 (6.62) .025 (7.06) .025 (7.17) .025 (7.13)
EXPSQ -.0003 (3.94) -.0003 (4.37) -.0003 (4.54) -.0003 (4.56)
LANG .197 (7.06) .188 (6.72) .368 (6.23)
CONC -.004 (4.67) -.0004 (.36)
LANGxCONC -.005 (3.47)
MARRIED -.025 (1.01) -.017 (.68) -.017 (.70) -.017 (.71)
URBAN .119 (4.81) .125 (5.11) .111 (4.53) .105 (4.28)
BLACK .028 (.18) .008 (.05) -.007 (.05) -.015 (.92)
NATIVE -.172 (1.2) -.161 (1.14) -.145 (1.03) -.141 (1.0)
ASIAN -.125 (.47) -.139 (.53) -.179 (.69) -.176 (.68)
RACE2 -.011 (.45) -.022 (.92) -.024 (1.0) -.023 (.97)
TRAN .002 (3.07) .002 (2.91) .002 (2.79) .002 (2.87)
constant 1.01 (15.1) 1.02 (15.48) 1.18 (15.94) 1.08 (13.62)
R2 .1124 .1301 .1378 .1421
Absolute t-ratios in parentheses.
11Table IV: Non-immigrant wage equation estimates
a. Men (obs.=6073)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
EDUC .081 (23.52) .081 (23.57) .079 (23.03) .079 (23.04)
EXP .034 (15.02) .034 (15.06) .034 (15.08) .034 (15.09)
EXPSQ -.0005 (9.84) -.0005 (9.86) -.0005 (9.89) -.0005 (9.90)
LANG -.063 (1.52) -.055 (1.33) .006 (.08)
CONC -.003 (.557) -.0005 (.21)
LANGxCONC -.002 (.84)
MARRIED .211 (12.97) .211 (13.0) .207 (12.77) .207 (12.75)
URBAN .121 (8.08) .120 (8.01) .095 (6.10) .095 (6.08)
BLACK .112 (1.40) .108 (1.35) .104 (1.31) .103 (1.29)
NATIVE -.192 (4.23) -.190 (4.18) -.196 (4.33) -.196 (4.34)
ASIAN -.351 (2.10) -.358 (2.15) -.366 (2.20) -.36 (2.16)
RACE2 .001 (.07) .0004 (.02) .004 (.29) .004 (.28)
TRAN .002 (6.02) .002 (5.99) .002 (6.04) .002 (6.03)
constant .815 (16.48) .871 (14.17) .983 (15.23) .923 (9.51)
R2 .2300 .2303 .2342 .2343
b. Women (obs.=5350)
Variable (5) (6) (7) (8)
EDUC .106 (28.96) .106 (29.0) .106 (28.81) .106 (28.83)
EXP .030 (12.97) .030 (13.01) .030 (13.03) .030 (13.02)
EXPSQ -.0004 (7.95) -.0004 (7.97) -.0004 (7.99) -.0004 (7.99)
LANG -.087 (1.85) -.086 (1.82) .003 (.03)
CONC -.0005 (.92) .002 (.86)
LANGxCONC -.003 (1.03)
MARRIED .055 (3.43) .055 (3.46) .054 (3.4) .055 (3.42)
URBAN .169 (10.83) .170 (10.87) .165 (10.19) .165 (10.20)
BLACK -.022 (.20) -.025 (.23) -.024 (.23) -.028 (.26)
NATIVE -.093 (1.97) -.094 (2.0) -.094 (2.0) -.093 (1.99)
ASIAN -.035 (.15) -.032 (.14) -.029 (.13) -.029 (.13)
RACE2 -.045 (2.84) -.044 (2.78) -.044 (2.75) -.044 (2.77)
TRAN .004 (8.68) .004 (8.63) .004 (8.61) .004 (8.63)
constant .343 (6.34) .423 (6.10) .442 (6.10) .354 (3.14)
R2 .2358 .2362 .2364 .2365
Absolute t-ratios in parentheses.
12